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Abstract
The issue of designing eective managerial incentives has recently
gained considerable attention in both theoretical analysis and business
practices. Despite the importance of the theoretical achievements, to
date little attempt has been made to test empirically the major the-
oretical hypotheses underlying incentive theories. More recently, the
debate has been fuelled by the development of economic experimen-
tal studies explicitly designed to investigate how real decision makers
subject to economic incentives behave. The aim of this paper is to
provide a comprehensive survey of experimental contributions to con-
tract and incentive design issues and to oer some suggestions for
future research.
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1 Introduction
In the past two decades the economic and management research community
has paid increasingly close attention to the issue of designing incentives for
managers (or, more in general, workers).
Numerous scholars, ranging from human resource scholars to social
psychologists, have contributed to the debate from dierent angles and
perspectives, and economic studies within the principal{agent framework
and contract design literature have substantially developed comprehensive
theoretical contributions.
This has been a striking phenomenon from the perspective of business
practices and fads as well. By way of examples of the revolution brought
about in corporate compensation policies, a recent survey based on a
sample of roughly ve hundred U.S. companies revealed that over 54% of
those companies had restructured their pay systems in order to reect
changes in corporate culture, the aim being to cope with market pressure
better. And most of the other companies agreed that change in pay systems
was strategically essential (Flannery et al., 1996). Moreover, in the past
years work group compensation and team incentive design have greatly
increased in popularity.
1
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Wellins et al. (1991) recently claimed that more than the 25% of U.S. rms had
implemented work group reward schemes.
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Numerous leading researchers agree that agency cost theory has brought
substantial theoretical advances in recent years. On the one hand, for
example, contract theory has shed considerable light on the nature of
optimal contracts under alternative assumptions on the parties involved in
the agency relationship, like the level and distribution of information
between them and dierences in attitudes towards risk (Holmstrom, 1982).
Tournament theory, on the other hand, has shown that when relative
compensation mechanisms rather than absolute measurements are
introduced, the results in terms of impact on workforce eort may be
greatly aected by manipulating group size or by the spread between
alternative payos (Lazear and Rosen, 1981).
The importance of these theoretical ndings notwithstanding, some authors
have recently suggested that empirical research in this eld has still to
gather momentum: not only are empirical studies seemingly
underdeveloped, but topics more relevant from a theoretical perspective
have been left largely untested by empirical studies. This is indeed true if
we consider that the bulk of empirical work has focused, on the one hand,
on econometric studies of the relationship between prot sharing or various
forms of employee stock ownership and labour productivity (Weitzman and
Kruse, 1990; of Labor, 1993) and, on the other, on surveys of corporate
compensation policies and the determinants of executive pay, as well as on
such related issues as the impact of executive turnover on company
performance (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Brunello et al., 1997; Murphy,
forthcoming). This literature arose during the eighties as the joint result of
growing interest in executive pay by the media and society and the
dramatically increasing levels of executive pay in the same period: as
Murphy pointed out \CEO pay research has grown even faster than CEO
paychecks" (Murphy, forthcoming). Despite the close connections with
principal{agent theory, the mainstream literature on incentives and pay has
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mainly focused on descriptive analysis of trends and fads arising from
business practices, analysing them with regard to rm's productivity and
protability, and using data from large databases on executive pay.
Surprisingly enough, there has been only marginal concern to challenge the
underlying theoretical framework. Little attempt has been made to
understand, for instance, the extent to which the normative prescriptions
arising from contract theory are robust. In short, most of the issues
relevant to a rm's human resources manager and mechanisms designer
seem to have been disregarded by \standard" empirical theory.
Among the more important issues ignored by empirical studies are the
following: the relative eectiveness of alternative types of group and
individual incentive systems; comparison between levels of eort enforceable
by means of relative versus absolute mechanisms of performance evaluation
(tournament); the intertemporal behavior and risk attitude of real decision
makers and managers; resolving the trade{o between individual pay and
motivation and work group cooperation; and so on.
On closer inspection there are sound reasons that justify, to some extent,
the lack of empirical research on these topics. In particular, as pointed out
by various authors (Walker, 1989; Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997), it should
be borne in mind that:
 most of the information required to test agency propositions is
dicult to observe and gather. Moreover, the majority of the
problems that arise when empirically studying the main issues of
agency theory and contract theory are due to a lack of natural data
on the relevant parameters (e.g. employee pay and productivity,
preference and production function parameters, individual utility and
cost functions, monitoring systems, and so on), and to the diculty of
controlling these parameters;
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 there are serious control problems, as well as the limits of endogeneity
of statistical techniques (especially in highly idiosyncratic
environments);
 experiments on the eects of incentives on the behavior of real
decision makers are dicult to set up in eld studies for instance,
legal diculties and conicts with trade unions are likely to arise and
it is dicult to isolate the eect of a single variable on productivity or
performance measures, given that it is impossible to controlling all
the other elements that may aect it (this is the well{known ceteris
paribus issue).
2
The inability of empirical research to address many underlying and
interesting theoretical issues of agency, motivation and compensation is, to
some extent, now diminishing. This is because data on compensation and
performance measures, also far below the top executive level, have become
increasingly available in recent years. Nevertheless, the arguments set out
earlier in this section suggest that the \standard" empirical literature may
be intrinsically limited when it tackles managerial incentives and
motivation topics.
As a result, an experimental approach seems reasonably able to shed light
on these issues, to the extent it can:
 isolate the behavior of subjects in stylized markets;
 conduct systematic analysis of ceteris paribus changes in institutional
variables;
2
The study by Petty et al. (1992), for instance, analyses the eects of the introduction
of an organizational incentive plan in a division of an electricity company: evidence of
the success of the organizational incentive plan is presented, as well as episodes of conict
between the union and managementwhich eventually led to cancellation of the experiment.
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 assess whether the incentive properties pointed out in the theory still
hold in actual behavior;
Moreover, this approach seems particularly suited to enhancing our
understanding of agency theory from the behavioral perspective. One of the
elements neglected in the game theoretical and mathematical adaptation of
the transaction cost economics framework is the fact that principal{agent
theory and contract theory develop their models without taking account of
bounded rationality (which, on the contrary, plays a major role in
transaction costs as one of the principal determinants of market failures
and the rise of hierarchies as transaction governance mechanisms). In this
respect, an experimental approach seems promising to the extent that it
enables investigation of how the bounded rationality of real decision makers
aects the outcome of numerous agency problems and issues traditionally
analysed in the light of \standard" rational self{interest behavioral
assumptions (Kreps, 1996).
In fact, as has been pointed out:
\. . . agency theory can be criticized from a behavioral
perspective for its narrow view of rationality and its assumptions
regarding economics agents' cognitive ability. . . . Despite its
generality, agency models fail to capture many important
aspects of behavior within organizations" (Levinthal, 1988)
Accordingly, laboratory experimentation seems to be the ideal instrument
with which to investigate problem{solving by real decision makers in
agency stylized settings, and their attitudes towards eort and risk.
The rest of this paper will seek to provide a comprehensive overview of
existing experimental research on managerial pay and incentive design. The
6
Managerial Incentives in Experimental Economics
paper is organized as follows: section 2 deals with tournament theory;
section 3 discusses and compares group and individual incentive schemes,
while section 4 investigates experimental laboratory markets issues.
Each section begins with a brief outline of the theoretical issues involved
and short discussion of how \standard" empirical studies have challenged
theory to date. There then follows a review of existing experimental
studies, with particular care taken to explain why an experimental
approach may yield further knowledge on the issue analyzed. Concluding
remarks, including suggestions for future experimental research, will be
made for each line of study.
2 Tournament Theory
Tournament theory is characterized by its focus on relative rather than
absolute performance as the independent variable inuencing retribution
mechanisms. Relative compensation fosters a person's motivation to the
extent that a prize (monetary reward, promotion, benet) is made
contingent on the comparison of his/her performance with that of
neighbours (competitors). From the the tournament administrator's point
of view, the advantages of employing evaluating procedures based on
relative performance may be that the latter is easier to observe than
absolute performance, and also that it is possible to eliminate (to some
extent) common noise and variability beyond the control of workers
(exogenous conditions) (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Lazear, 1995).
One of the simplest possible instances of tournament, and one of the most
pervasive in business practices, is the so{called rank order tournament,
where the payment scheme depends only on the ranking of performance.
This situation can be set up by dening a number of specic elements viz.:
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 prizes: these are xed in advance and made independent of absolute
performance; they may consist in monetary prizes, promotion slots,
etc.;
 comparison method: workers' performances are measured and
compared. The best performer is awarded the highest prize, and so
on. No importance is given to how much one worker outperforms the
others: on the contrary, only the rank order matters.
Suppose that two workers are competing for a promotion. The tournament
administrator, in designing the relative compensation scheme, has to choose
the prizes carefully, taking into account that:
 the average prize money must be suciently high to attract workers
to come and work in the rm in the rst place (this principle is also
known as participation constraint);
 the eort that a worker puts into his/her job depends both on the size
of the two prizes and on the spread between them: the higher the
winner prize and the salary spread, the more eort a worker will make;
 the salary spread connected to the promotion cannot be innite,
because of the rm's funds problem, but also because of the
decreasing returns of compensation on eort costs;
 if the measured outcome of a worker's performance depends on
contingencies beyond his/her control (e.g. luck), s/he will be less
motivated to make more eort.
Tournament theory has yielded analytical understanding on how
promotions and other compensation mechanisms may motivate worker
8
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behavior. It has explained, at least qualitatively (comparative static
analysis), how worker eort may be aected by design variables (for
instance the prize spread, accuracy in monitoring performance) as well as
external variables (risk level of the industry, luck).
Despite the importance of its achievements, the assertions of tournament
theory have rarely been tested by empirical studies. A major explanation
for the lack of empirical research is the diculty of gathering natural data
(for instance, worker cost functions). Some relevant exceptions do exist,
however: Antle and Smith (1986), for instance, examined the pay of
corporate executives using a large sample of corporations, nding that rms
implicitly reward managers on the basis of personal performance relative to
that of other managers, and on the basis of the rm's performance relative
to that of other rms in the same industry. Lambert et al. (1993) found
that hierarchical structures in some organizations are compatible with
tournament theory. Many empirical studies both in the United States and
European countries have found that both the remuneration of CEOs and
their turnover, or probability of maintaining their position, depend on their
performance relative to that of the industry (Gibbons and Murphy, 1990;
Brunello et al., 1998).
All these studies provide evidence that relative performance is a recurrent
pattern in compensation systems and may play an important role in
determining promotions within rms. They are not directly concerned to
test specic predictions arising from tournament theory or to validate the
main assertions of that theory. Some exceptions do exist, even though the
most striking evidence comes from settings dierent from business ones, like
sporting events. Rosen (1984), for instance, analyses the distribution of
prizes in sports matchplay tournaments; Ehrenberg and Bognanno
examined the behavior of professional golfers and nd evidence that richer
tournaments yield better performances, although they were unable to
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distinguish between the inuence on motivation exerted by prize spreads or
by higher prize levels (Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990b,a).
A nice test of tournament theory in recruitment decisions has been carried
out by Ash (1990), whose analysis of navy recruiters showed that they
behaved as if they were in a tournament, and that their behavior was
inuenced by the way in which performances were measured (for instance,
they emphasized quantity over quality when the former variable was a key
factor in comparison of relative performances). Finally, Knoeber and
Thurman (1994) has validated three interesting assertions of tournament
theory within a business framework (producers of broiler chickens): changes
in the level of prizes which leave the prizes spread unaltered do not aect
performances; more able players choose less risky strategies and tournament
administrators attempt to reduce the disincentive eects of mixed
tournaments by minimizing dierences between players.
Overall, the empirical literature supportive of tournament theory seems at
least to be narrow-focused. It gives the impression that many important
theoretical issues have still to be investigated, and that the consequences of
relative incentive schemes on the behavior of real decision makers are still
far from being completely understood. For instance, how do dierent
attitudes towards risk and towards cooperation aect the eorts of real
workers and the performance of real rms? Which is more motivating: the
prizes spread or the average level of prizes? What consequences arise if
heterogeneous agents are introduced? Do real decision makers fail to
recognize equivalent trade{os among noise and prize spread, and do they
exhibit well{know judgement biases in evaluating alternative tournaments?
What performance and eciency consequences derive from armative
action programmes and equal opportunity laws in tournaments? These,
just to name the few, are relevant empirical issues which, to date, have
been neglected by empirical research.
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The experimental literature on tournaments has been minimal: in the rest
of this section I shall summarise the most notable studies on the matter.
2.1 An eciency comparison between Tournament
and Piece Rate schemes
Bull et al. (1987) were the rst to examine in laboratory conditions of the
properties of rank{order tournaments compared with piece rate reward
schemes. They studied two{person, symmetric rank{order tournaments of
the following form: there are two agents i and j, each of which has the
following utility function:
u
k
(p
k
; e
k
) = p
k
  e
2
k
=c; 8k = i; j
where p
k
is agent k's payment and the second term is agent k's cost
function, which increases with the square of eort e
k
(normalized by c).
Agent k's payment is dened as:
p
i
=
8
<
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i
> y
j
m if y
i
< y
j
where y
k
= e
k
+ 
k
is dened as the output of agent k. Direct observation of
eort is not possible: only performances can be measured by the principal,
and they are equal to the sum of eort and 
k
 U [ a; a]i:i:d:, which can
be interpreted as a random shock. Consequently, the principal (the
tournament administrator) has imperfect technology with which to measure
the agents' performance; or alternatively, environmental noise somehow
interferes with the eort and aects the performance of one agent.
Theoretical predictions arm that equilibrium eorts will be as in the
following formula:
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(M  m)c
4a
= e

:
They will consequently increase proportionally with the spread between
prizes (M  m) and will move inversely with the variance of  and the cost
of eort (multiplied by 1=c).
From the business practices perspective this can be stated in the following
terms: managers will be more motivated in their work if the payo increase
connected with a promotion is large, and if random elements do not overly
aect the measurement (performance) of their eort.
Given this theoretical frame of reference, Bull and colleagues then tested
some theoretical assumptions on the robustness of equilibrium predictions,
on the absence of illusory eects, on the role of information in this class of
games, and on the equivalence of tournaments with piece rate schemes.
They designed ten dierent experiments, in which subjects were paired at
random and given information on all the parameters of the game except the
identity of their matched player. Each tournament lasted 12 rounds. Even
if in real contexts one shot tournaments are observed, the authors claimed
that the complex decisions underlying the tournament game justied the
repetition.
By way of summary, they found that:
 the theory holds on average, i.e. it correctly predicts the behavior of
subjects in symmetric tournaments at an aggregate level, while single
runs of the game display high levels of variance;
 there is no illusion eect: changes in the parameters of the game
which leave the equilibrium unaected do not result in a change in
the behavior observed;
12
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 information plays a major role in behavior: if players are told not
only the rank order (whether they lose or win the tournament) but
also the actual performance of the other player, they devote higher
than optimal (from their perspective, not from that of the
tournament administrator) eort to their work; or at least
convergence to equilibrium levels is slower. By contrast, this was not
the case when information about the other player's actual eort was
given to subjects;
 in asymmetric tournaments
3
disadvantaged contestants make a
greater eort than predicted by the theory; and the theory also
slightly underpredicts the eort of advantaged subjects. No
disengagement eects are found: disadvantaged contestants do not
completely shirk their work because they realize that they are
handicapped and unlikely to win the tournament, compared with
their advantaged opponents;
 tournament schemes are on average able to elicit the same level of
eort as piece rate schemes, but they give rise to higher variance of
behavior, since the game nature of the issue (conjectural variations)
and the discontinuity of payo functions result in greater diculties
in computing, or learning over time, the optimal strategy with respect
to the diculty of solving an individual decision making problem, as
in the case of piece rate
From the rm's perspective, this higher variance can be viewed as a
3
Asymmetric tournaments are tournaments in which the participants have dierent
skills or dierent attitudes towards eort. One player with a higher (lower) eort cost than
another is called the disadvantaged (advantaged) player'. Tournament theory predicts that
in asymmetric tournaments subjects will, in equilibrium, display a level of eort inversely
proportional to their eort cost (for formal analysis of the equilibrium see Bull et al.
(1987)).
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risk embedded in the institutional mechanism of relative pay, which is
higher than other incentive scheme and must be taken into account
when designing managerial incentives.
2.2 Asymmetrical tournaments, equal opportunity
laws and armative actions
Despite the large body of literature on armative action programmes and
equal opportunity laws, there is little empirical analysis of how these
impact on rms' eciency. Traditional views justify the existence or the
imposition of these programmes and laws on rms on the ground that their
net value should be non negative (the balance between the increased utility
of the categories of workers beneting from these instruments and the
decreased utility of rms in terms of reduced eciency). Schotter and
Weigelt (1992) investigated these issues in an experimental tournament
setting and found that in many situations the supposed trade{o between
equity and eciency does not arise; indeed, on the contrary, both workers
and rms may benet from the introduction of instruments regulating the
internal labour market.
From the perspective of tournament theory, equal opportunity laws force
tournament administrators to set up symmetric tournaments instead of the
asymmetric ones that would naturally arise given the presence of dierences
in abilities, skills and eort costs among workers. On the other side,
armative action programmes can be viewed as asymmetric tournaments
where agents are identically skilled but some of them are discriminated
against, while others (disadvantaged groups like minorities, women, and so
on) are favoured.
The main ndings of Schotter and Weigelt (1992) can be summarized as
14
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follows:
 While the baseline experiment on symmetrical tournaments
substantially replicated the previous results of Bull et al. (see the
previous subsection), the experiments on asymmetrical tournaments
told a dierent story: from the aggregate perspective, subjects
behaved as the theory would have predicted (no oversupply of eort
by disadvantaged subjects can be inferred from aggregate results).
Closer inspection of the data revealed that, when the degree of
asymmetry was large, disadvantaged subjects divided roughly into
two groups: some of them oversupplied their eort while others
dropped out, supplying zero eort. The authors claim that this was
due to learning process from disadvantaged players in the early stages
of the game conditioned to bad or good luck and to aggressive play of
opponents.
 Equal opportunity laws were simulated in the experimental setting by
comparing symmetrical tournament outcomes with that of 2{person
unfair tournaments that is, tournaments in which subjects have
identical cost functions and one of them is discriminated against in
that he or she must produce an output that is greater than the
opponent in order to assure himself to have equal probabilities to
receive the winner's prize (M). The introduction of equal opportunity
(eliminating rule asymmetries) results in increases in output and in
the likelihood that previously disadvantaged individuals will win the
tournament. Overall, the introduction of equal opportunity laws is
benecial to both managers and the rms administering the
tournament.
 The role of armative actions programmes was investigated by
comparing the outcomes of uneven tournaments (asymmetrical costs)
15
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against the outcomes of uneven and unfair tournaments, when the
armative action consisted in counterbalancing the degree of
asymmetry by imposing an unfair supply rule (as described above) on
the advantaged player. Armative action programmes had mixed
eects in the experiment: when dierences among advantaged and
disadvantaged subjects were not severe, the introduction of such
programmes increased both the probability of winning and the
expected payo for disadvantaged subjects, but they also resulted in
losses for the tournament administrator (decrease in total output).
By contrast, when asymmetries were severe, armative action
programmes were benecial both to disadvantaged subjects and to
the rms implementing such programmes.
2.3 Tournaments in group incentives schemes
Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) have recently conducted experiments on a
variety of group incentive schemes.
They show that relative performance schemes which compare among the
productivities of dierent working groups are able to elicit higher levels of
worker eort than many target{based group schemes. For a more complete
analysis of their ndings see also section 3 of this paper.
2.4 Further investigation
The literature surveyed in this section bears out many of the contentions of
tournament theory, although it also highlights some discrepancies between
the theory and behavior observed in laboratory conditions. Overall, it
seems that much work still remains to be done in order to understand the
16
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behavioral properties of these schemes more precisely. In particular, the
following lines of research seem promising:
 What are the causes of high variance and path dependent behavior in
the early stages of the game? While some explanations of high
variance have already been given by previous research, it seems still
puzzling with respect to learning process occurring in the early stages
of the game.
 It seems that behavior in asymmetrical tournament games depends
crucially on the goals pursued by the subjects. As noted in the
experimental literature, some players may not be solely concerned to
maximize their monetary reward minus the cost of eort; they may
also be motivated by a desire to win the game. It would be interesting
to elaborate these topics in order to understand whether defocusing
instructions and changing the experimental environment results in
behavior closer to the equilibrium prediction.
 No previous experiments have investigated the trade{o between
eciency and collaboration supposedly typical of tournaments and
crucial in inuencing the decision to implement a tournament within
a rm. From the perspective of the tournament administrator, it
would be interesting to investigate how this trade{o for workers
could be lessened without resorting to traditional instrument devised
by the theory, such as pay compression.
 When workers are allowed to choose which tournament to join (as is
often the case in the professional job market), it would be interesting
to investigate, from a behavioral standpoint, whether dierent criteria
from those predicted by tournament theory are used to compare
among the alternative contracts, and to what extent the heuristics and
17
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biases in individual decision making problems may be transferred into
these kind of decisions. For instance, rather than comparing among
dierent tournaments using the participation constraint and average
salary, workers may rely on heuristics similar to those employed in
decision making under uncertainty, such as maximin or maximax.
3 Comparison between individual and group
incentive schemes
Despite the greatly increased popularity of group incentive schemes in the
past decades, few studies have empirically addressed their impact on
corporate performance and the issue of whether they are truly eective
devices in eliciting optimal (from the principal's perspective) worker eort
levels.
The eectiveness of group and individual incentive schemes from the
behavioral perspective were being analyzed in experimental settings by
economists, sociologists and psychologists even prior to the development of
agency theory. This was basically because of the already widespread use of
incentive schemes, and the similarities of many of them to already
well{known social dilemma games.
It is worth mentioning a number of pioneering works, which, though
plagued by methodological limitations and aws in the design of the
laboratory experiments or quasi{experiments in eld settings, began
systematic examination of the behavioral properties of individual and group
incentive schemes with respect to their ability to elicit high levels of worker
eort, and as a result high levels of productivity for rms.
A distinction should be drawn between, on the one hand, studies on how
18
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individual variable pay versus xed pay aects productivity, and on the
other, studies which investigate the role of group incentive schemes. While
the former have been carried out in experimental and eld study settings,
providing clear evidence of the eectiveness of individual incentives in
enhancing productivity
4
, the latter have shown that group incentive
schemes may have a dierent impact on productivity.
For instance, many early studies discovered that when so{called egalitarian
revenue sharing was implemented (where group output is equally divided
among participants, regardless of dierences among individual
contributions), some robust results were obtained. For instance, it was
found that workers had less control over their individual earnings because
they depended on the group's productivity. As a result, the better
performers were likely to reduce the of amount eort they put into their
work, while poorer performers were likely to shirk in order to benet from
the labour of the other members of the group (the so{called free{riding'
eect). It was also found that the size of the group had a strong eect on
eort, since as the group size increased the individual worker lost control
over his or her payo.
The rst studies on the impact of simple group reward schemes on workers'
productivity date back at least to Marriott (1949), who was the rst to
report evidence that workers paid on an individual basis are slightly more
productive than those paid according to group incentive schemes.
Moreover, in his seminal eld study Marriott found an inverse correlation
between group size and the performance of workers in large factories (with
group sizes ranging from 0{10 to over 50 people). Some years later,
Campbell (1952) obtained similar results using 20{40{person groups.
Schwab (1973), nally, reached similar conclusions using compared
4
Dickinson and Gillette (1993) gives a large review on this topic.
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performance{pay instrumentality scores.
Laboratory analysis of the matter has focused mainly on smaller groups.
Farr (1976) analyzed the eectiveness of xed hourly pay, individual
variable pay, egalitarian revenue sharing, and tournament pay in 3{person
groups. He found no dierence among variable pay schemes: all of them
performed better than the xed scheme. London and Oldham (1977)
compared xed hourly pay, the individual incentive system (piece-rate) and
three dierent group reward schemes (egalitarian revenue sharing, high
performer pay, low performer pay for all the players involved) in 2{person
teams.
5
The laboratory implementation was a card sorting task (a design
that typically does not control for the subjects' eort cost). The main
results were as follows: individual and high performer treatments performed
better than other ones; being the top performer in a 2{person team
reinforced achievement and motivation in treatments where the other
participant did not benet from it, or did not reduce the payment to the
rst player; in the higher performer treatment, over time the lower
performer felt obliged to counterbalance the top performer's action by
improving his or her performance, which suggests that equity considerations
may be at work. Moreover, it is signicant that this did not happen in the
egalitarian revenue sharing treatment, where the lower performer took
advantage of the higher eort levels of the top worker. Finally Stoneman
and Dickinson (1989) compared the behavior of workers in a simulated
check{entering task without pecuniary payments and found no dierence
among the performances of groups of dierent size (2{4{5{9{person groups)
with respect to the performance level under individual incentive schemes.
It is evident from this short survey of the literature that ndings in
laboratory and eld settings diverge. The discrepancies stem from the fact
5
This reects a conceptualization of group tasks originally proposed by Steiner (1972).
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that the rst attempts to model group incentive mechanisms in laboratory
conditions were poor in design quality and failed to control for the utility
functions of the subjects involved in the experiment (as in the card sorting
task experiment). Another reason may be that most eld studies, unlike
experiments, focused on dierent group sizes: whilst most of the
experiments involved very small groups (ranging from 2 or 3{person teams
to 9{person groups), the eld studies typically investigated larger groups.
6
As a result, the remainder of this section will focus on two recent papers:
the rst concerns a card sorting task experiment where group size was
increased in order to compare the results with eld studies; the second
focused on 6{person groups using a game theoretical framework which
made it possible to control for utility function and eort cost.
3.1 Group Productivity in a Card Sorting Task
Honeywell et al. (1990) sought to compare experimental ndings with the
results of eld studies. They set up a card sorting task game, and
contrasted productivity under individual incentive conditions (a base pay
for sorting a xed minimum of cards and a piece rate if the performance
exceeded 25% of the target) with a group incentive condition (where the
same mixed scheme { target based and piece rate { was computed with
respect to the group's average performance). Within subjects
experimentation was used (i.e. the same subjects were used to test
individual and group schemes) in order to assess whether a social loang
phenomenon existed (people tend to decrease their productivity in groups),
and public feedback (common knowledge of payos) was provided in order
to simulate an actual work environment.
6
For instance, a recent survey has claimed that organizations employing small group
incentives had work groups with a modal value of 10 persons (Peck, 1990).
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It was found that individual performance was comparable under individual
and group incentives: the top performers under individual schemes were
also top performers under group schemes, and vice versa. This was
consistent with previous ndings (Farr, 1976; Stoneman and Dickinson,
1989), but it conicted with other experimental and eld studies (London
and Oldham, 1977). The social loang eect
7
was only observed among
low performers (they continued to perform below the average in order to
benet from the performance of the other members), while it was not found
among high performers (they did not decrease their performance in reaction
to opportunistic behavior by lower performers). The authors'
interpretation, following Stoneman and Dickinson (1989), was that high
performers in small groups realize that lowering their performance may
further reduce their earnings.
A tentative explanation of these results may be that, although a card
sorting task provides a setting more similar to a real working environment,
and although it permits observation of the subjects' real attitudes toward
eort levels (rather than simply assuming eort disutility at increasing
rates, as in the paper summarized in next subsection), it may yield
outcomes that are dicult to analyse. Moreover, the alternating treatment
(subjects were rewarded in even sessions under individual schemes, and in
odd ones under group schemes) may not be the ideal way to investigate the
emergence of diering behaviors in group and individual incentive schemes:
the subjects may learn to avoid eort and to free ride under group incentive
schemes only over a longer period of time. Moreover, the experimental
instructions were, in my view, too informative of the aim of the research:
\You are being invited to participate in a research study
investigating the eects of monetary incentives on work
7
See Dierks and McNally (1987) for thorough treatment.
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performance...The information obtained from this study may
allow businesses to better design pay systems that satisfy both
the organization and the employee." (Honeywell et al., 1990).
The subjects may very well have been biased by this information. Finally,
it seems that interactions among subjects between the end of one session
and the beginning of the next (the experimenters needed 10 minutes to
compute the results) were not controlled, and idle talk or other interactions
among the subjects may have aected experimental outcome.
3.2 Productivity Under Various Group Incentives
In a recent paper, Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) describe an experimental
investigation of group moral hazard performance in several common group
incentive schemes. They focus their analysis on the behavioral and
operational mechanisms enacted by incentive structures, and they compare
the outcomes of experiments on performance under group incentive systems
with the theoretical predictions and with experiments on performance
under individual incentive systems with probabilistic monitoring and
eciency wages.
For this purpose they used a basic principal{agent framework, summarized
as follows: there is a principal running a rm with six agents. Each agent i
chooses an eort level e
i
2 [0; 100]. Eort is costly for agent i and is
represented by function C(e
i
) = e
2
i
=100. Firm output depends on the
agents' individual eort levels as well as on a stochastic variable  (which
can be interpreted as luck or as the existence of an imperfect technology in
monitoring the agents' performance), as in the following formula:
Y =
6
X
1
e
i
+    U [ 40; 40];
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There is excess demand in the market, so that all the output produced by
agents is placed at the xed price p = 1:5 per unit. As a consequence the
rm's revenue function is as follows:
R = 1:5Y = 1:5
 
6
X
1
e
i
+ 
!
:
The Pareto{Optimal eort levels for each agent can then be
straightforwardly derived as follows:
max = 1:5
 
6
X
1
e
i
+ 
!
 
6
X
1
e
2
i
=100;
) (f.o.c.) @
i
=@e
i
= 1:5 2e
i
=100 = 0; i = 1; 2; : : : ; 6; ) e
i
= 75:
Thus, the principal's problem is to design an incentive scheme that will
implement these Pareto{Optimal eort levels as Nash equilibrium for the
agents.
Nalbantian and Schotter compare the following group and individual
incentive schemes:
Partnership Schemes: Egalitarian Revenue Sharing This has been
the rst group decision scheme traditionally investigated in early
experiments and eld studies. The scheme is comparable to the
voluntary contribution mechanism of public good theory and shares
with social dilemmas the problem that free riding is a dominating
strategy, since all the revenue generated by the rm is shared equally
among members and each worker's nal payo is simply his/her
revenue share minus his/her cost of eort. In fact, although everyone
would be better o if everyone else contributed to the rm's output
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with optimal eort, each agent has a personal interest in shirking or
free riding in order to benet in revenue generated by other agents
without incurring eort costs. Formally we have:

i
= 1:5
 
6
X
1
e
i
+ 
!
=6   
2
i
=100:
Target Based Schemes Forcing Contracts Within this scheme a
revenue target is set by the principal. If it is achieved, the workers
share all the revenue generated; if it is not, a relatively low penalty
wage is assigned to each worker. Holmstrom (1982) originally devised
this scheme in order to avoid free riding eects in team compensation.
In their paper the scheme takes the following form:

i
=
8
<
:
1:5 (
P
e
i
+ ) =6   e
2
i
=100 if 1:5(
P
e
i
+ )  R

B otherwise.
Tournament{Based Schemes: Competitive Teams Relative rather
than absolute performance measurements are implemented by the
authors by dividing the rm into two 6{person teams (T
1
and T
2
) and
having these two teams compete for prizes. The team producing the
highest output receives the big prize, the loser receives the small one.
The payo for any worker i on Team 1 is dened in the following
formula, where TR is a transfer made from the winning team to the
losing one.

i
(Y
1
; Y
2
; e
i
) =
8
<
:
R
i
+TR
6
 
e
2
i
100
if Y
1
> Y
2
R
i
 TR
6
 
e
2
i
100
if Y
1
> Y
2
Individualistic Schemes: Monitoring Absolute and relative group
mechanisms are compared to individual wage schemes with
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supervision mechanisms: in the latter case the rm oers its workers
an individual wage W greater than their opportunity wage w should
they make a given eort of e

set by the principal. In each period
there is a probability of p that the rm will check the worker's eort
level: if s/he is caught free riding s/he will be red. Formally:

i
=
8
<
:
W if rnd > p
red if rnd < p
The experimental design consisted in the random and anonymous division
of a large sample of college undergraduates (408) into groups of 6 persons.
During the experiment, each subject was told only his/her own eort level
and the group output level (no individual information on the performance
of other players was given), and s/he performed two dierent experiments
based on dierent incentive schemes. Each experiment lasted 25 rounds.
The order of the two experiments was reversed for half of the population in
order to analyze how history and past experience with dierent incentive
schemes aected group performance.
The main results of the paper can be thus summarized:
 When free riding is the dominant strategy (as in egalitarian revenue
sharing), subjects gradually take advantage of shirking opportunities,
and levels of eort drop; this outcome closely resembles well{known
results in voluntary contribution mechanisms in public goods
(Ledyard, 1995) and highlights the social dilemma of workers'
performance in team production: a nding that dates back at least to
Marschak and Radner (1972).
 Relative schemes elicit the higher mean eort: none of the schemes
induce near{to{equilibrium eort levels from the subjects, although
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competitive tournaments clearly predominate over any other
mechanisms.
 History matters: the previous experience of subjects with revenue
sharing schemes leads to lower outputs in subsequent non revenue
sharing experiments (lower than when the non revenue experiment is
performed rst). It seems that workers show inertial behavior and
that past experience modies the experimental subjects' perception of
trust and fairness.
 Comparison with individual schemes based on monitoring shows that
they are able, like group tournaments, to elicit higher levels of eort,
but that they are also more costly for the rm (only high detection
levels in monitoring lead to high eort levels, while low detection
levels lead to free riding).
The study of Nalbantian and Schotter provides a clear benchmark on the
theme of group incentive design and open the way to a rich agenda of
additional research. Their analysis treats rm performance as the sole
outcome of a non{cooperative game: it focuses only on the behavioral
properties of incentive schemes in eliciting the Pareto{optimal levels of
eort, while making little or no attempt to understand how elements such
as social norms and dierent regimes of communication may aect the
outcome of the experimental interaction. Moreover, the role of group size is
not investigated, and one may consider the treatment of eort not as
common information as too narrow, given that in naturally occurring work
situations workers may check the level of eort put into the job by their
colleagues (so as to detect and sanction free riding), and principals may be
able to enforce the desired level of eort by their agents not solely by giving
them incentive schemes but also by explicitly communicating the target
desired (in terms of eort levels).
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3.3 Suggestion for further research
The literature surveyed in this section conrms that the experimental
approach may be a valuable instrument with which to test, in controlled
conditions, interesting theoretical issues concerning the properties of
incentive schemes. Overall, it seems that much work is still required to
understand more precisely the behavioral properties of these schemes and
how they interact with environmental conditions. In addition to the
suggestions and criticisms already introduced while surveying the papers in
this section, the following lines of research should be pursued further:
 The group incentive scheme framework displays many similarities
with the public good literature. As Table 1 shows, many incentive
schemes can be matched to an analogous public good feature, while
other elements are peculiar to one framework. Despite the
similarities, very little has been done to compare and understand
whether the large body of ndings and regularities yielded by public
good experimentation still hold in the incentive framework, and
whether dierent outcomes may arise in the latter frame as the result
of specic elements, or merely as the result of simple semantic
dierences over the same underlying formal problem.
8
;
 The information given to players may be a variable that importantly
aects motivation to eort, as well as the dierent opportunities for
communication given to agents.
 Some major issues seem still underestimated from the perspective of
the principal interested in the design of ecient incentive mechanisms.
For instance, to what extent does history matter when a change in
8
There are, however, some important exceptions: see for instance the paper by Croson
(1995).
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Table 1: A comparision between the features of group incentive schemes and
public good schemes (adapted from Nalbantian and Schotter (1997))
group incentive schemes public goods schemes
revenue sharing voluntary contribution
forcing contract threshold
? \money{back" threshold
competitive teams ?
gainsharing / prot sharing ?
the incentive scheme is implemented, and what instruments may be
introduced in order to reduce the problem of a lock{in to free{riding
strategy and to diuse trust and cooperative behavior among agents?
 As pointed out by Welbourne and Cable (1995), very little is known
about how agents interpret these incentive programmes, and how
dierent dispositions towards an incentive scheme may result in
dierent outcomes (increases in productivity). The coherence between
the rm's and workers' views of group incentive plans are not always
controlled by the incentive designer: whilst rms may implement
group incentive plans in an endeavour to encourage employees to
identify with the specic needs of a particular business, or to promote
organizational membership roles, workers may evaluate these schemes
dierently. Given that group incentives may have dierent
motivational values because they can be understood in dierent ways
by workers, laboratory investigation techniques such as protocol
analysis and post{experiment interviews may shed light on how
group incentives give rise to identity processes aecting workers
saliency of work related roles (organization member or team partner
versus individual job holder) and may ultimately result in dierent
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behavior. This may lead to test in laboratory conditions more
realistic and complete accounts of worker motivation. An example
may be Frank's status theory, which suggests that status
considerations may be more motivating than monetary reward in
shaping employee behavior (Frank, 1984, 1985).
 Finally, it seems crucially important to understand the extent to
which rst move outcomes may result in path dependency, and which
elements may be successfully controlled in order to direct interaction
among the agents towards the desired outcome.
4 Experimental labour markets and
reciprocity
Research on experimental markets was rst conducted by Fehr and
colleagues, and it has acquired major importance in the many agency
debates on labour markets, contract incompleteness and enforcement issues.
The aim of these studies is to test, in the context of competitive
experimental markets, whether contract enforcement and bargaining among
principals and agents may be aected by their attitude towards reciprocal
and fair behavior.
Within the framework of the experimental labour market, a rst group of
studies have investigate the existence of the so{called fair wage{eort
hypothesis' (Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990), which states that
wage increases raise workers' eort levels, and that, as a result, involuntary
employment may result because rms may have the incentive to pay wages
above the competitive level. Fehr jointly with other scholars (Fehr et al.,
1993; Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1998; Fehr and Falk, forthcoming; Fehr,
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Kirchler, Weichbold and Gachter, 1998; Fehr and Tougareva, 1995) has
conducted experiments based on the so-called Gift Exchange Game: that is,
a two{stage game which can be summarized as follows: the rst{stage is a
wage determination game in which workers (agents) and rms (principals)
trade for stipulating job contracts with each other; in the second{stage,
workers who have concluded a contract with a rm must choose an eort
level.
Predictions based on the standard rational and selsh hypothesis suggest
that workers will make minimal eort (because eorts above that level are
increasingly costly) no matter what wage they receive. because rms are
aware of this, they will respond by paying the competitive (zero rent) wage
corresponding to the minimum eort level. The experimental ndings,
however, show that average wages are substantially above the competitive
wage corresponding to the minimum eort level, and that rm's wage
payments contain substantial amounts of rent (wages are much higher than
the competitive wage corresponding to the workers' actual eort choices).
There is much evidence to suggest that this result may be exceptionally
robust: in particular Fehr's papers show that the positive wage{eort
relationship is very robust across dierent institutions, such as one{sided
oral bid auctions (Fehr et al., 1993; Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1998),
double auctions (Fehr and Falk, forthcoming), bilateral bargaining (Fehr,
Kirchler, Weichbold and Gachter, 1998), and across dierent stake sizes
(Fehr and Tougareva, 1995). Moreover, in competitive treatments (such as
one{sided oral bid auctions and double auctions), there was an exogenous
excess supply of workers (so that rms were playing the game from a strong
position, since they had the power to enforce rather unfair contracts).
Nevertheless, fair contracting emerged and no learning eects toward
equilibrium over time were observed. Finally, it is surprising that even in
double action markets (the most competitive market institutions) wages are
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roughly similar to those in the bilateral institution: which conrms that
competition among workers even in the double auction has a negligible
impact on wage formation, and that fairness and reciprocity seemingly play
a dominant role.
A critique of these studies might centre on their analysis of certain
implementation elements. For instance, rms payo functions were
designed so to avoid the possibility of losses, although this does not seem
entirely reasonable.
A second line of research comprises experiments that deepen inquiry into
whether and to what extent reciprocity is able to mitigate the so{called
contract enforcement problem. This problem is typical of agency
relationships because many employment contracts are incomplete and
workers have some eort discretion; thus whenever rms have limited
enforcement technology and deal with rational and purely selsh workers,
they are unable to enforce the ecient eort level, and can only achieve a
minimal eort level below the ecient one. On the other hand, a subject is
said to behave in a reciprocal manner if s/he is willing to forgo some money
in order to punish behavior that he or she considers unfair, or to reward
behavior that he or she considers fair. It is argued that the reciprocal
behavior of principals and agents may drive the outcome of a typical
contract enforcement game far from the shirking equilibrium, and that it is
a successful device with which to raise eort levels above the minimum.
Fehr and Gachter contrasted a two{stage treatment (where only workers
could respond reciprocally to rms' oer) with a three{stage one (where,
conversely, both workers and rms could respond reciprocally) (Fehr and
Gachter, 1998). Subsequently, Fehr et al. (1997) studied both these settings
and also introduced, as a treatment variable, the absence or presence of an
imperfect monitoring technology (nes that a third party, such as a court,
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may impose on the shirking worker with some probabilities). The main
ndings of these studies are as follows: in the 2{stage setting rms cannot
completely enforce their desired eort level. Workers reciprocate to rms
oering wage levels higher than the minimum. In the 3{stage treatment the
contract enforcement problem is further reduced: now also rms can
reciprocate to workers behavior, rewarding or punishing behavior considered
unfair (note that this action is costly for the rm and is consequently not
rational from an equilibrium perspective). Finally, the introduction of
external monitoring and nes undermines, at least in the 2{stage
treatment, reciprocal responses and reduces the average eorts of workers.
These ndings suggest that reciprocity (and especially double reciprocity)
generates a signicant increase in eort levels, compared with the
prediction based on selsh preference assumptions, and that it considerably
mitigates the contract enforcement problem. Thus reciprocity may be
viewed, at least from a behavioral perspective, as a viable solution to the
problem of contract enforcement, and as even more eective than such
traditional responses as the explicit threat of nes for workers
undersupplying eorts. Gachter and Falk have elaborated further on this
observation, showing that incentive contracting, nes and monitoring, as
well as other explicit enforcement instruments, may result in lower levels of
eort, since they may crowd out implicit reciprocity attitudes of principals
and agents. They also suggest that, in the case of repeated interaction,
reciprocity plays a major role in reputation formation, which in itself
mitigates the contract enforcement problem (Gachter and Falk, 1998).
This line of inquiry has shed considerably light on how experimental labour
market outcomes may be aected by reciprocal behavior, an element
traditionally ruled out in the analysis of standard economic theory. It
would be interesting to develop this analysis in the following directions:
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 Reciprocity motives have been observed in many ultimatum game
experiments
9
. These are bargaining games where two subjects must
agree on sharing a certain amount of money: one party makes an oer
which the other may accept (in this case the amount of money is
divided as agreed by the parties) or reject (in this case neither gets
nothing). Although the theory predicts that the party making the
oer will be advantaged and will ask for anything up to the entire
amount, since it is rational for the responder to accept any positive
amount, laboratory experimentation shows that the majority of
oering parties propose a fair split of the amount. It may be
interesting to compare whether, in the setting of experimental
markets, rents are shared between principals and agents in a manner
that diers from ultimatum games. These, to my knowledge, are
matters still to be investigated experimentally.
 It would also be interesting to investigate how the learning process
interacts with reciprocity outcomes. For instance, whereas in the
2{stage treatment outlined above workers learn over time to respond
reciprocally to fair oers made by rms, in the 3{stage treatment
they start reciprocating from the outset and no learning eects can be
detected.
5 Final remarks
The past sections have roughly sketched the contribution of the
experimental economics literature to analysis of issues related to managerial
incentive design. Despite the incompleteness of the survey, it should be
evident that an experimental approach may be a valuable instrument with
9
See Roth for an extensive review (Roth, 1995).
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which to test and challenge, under controlled conditions, a wide variety of
interesting theoretical issues, such as the behavioral properties of various
types of incentive scheme, and how the real behavior of agents and
principals is aected by reciprocity considerations. First results of
experimental studies are particularly useful and interesting to incentive
designers in organizations, and they emphasise the need for further
laboratory investigation.
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